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The press and freedom of speech 
in Ukraine ahead of parliamentary elections
Tadeusz Iwański
The independence of the mass media has been regularly restricted over 
the past two years in Ukraine. Following a period of relative freedom 
in 2005–2010, the scope of direct and indirect government control of 
the press has increased, cancelling out the achievements of the Orange 
Revolution in this area. The press in Ukraine is less and less able to per-
form its role as watchdog on the government and politicians and as a re-
liable source of information on the situation in the country to the public. 
This is mainly due to: (1) the concentration of the most important mass 
media in the hands of Ukraine’s most powerful oligarchs, whose business 
interests depend on the government; (2) the use of the press as instru-
ments in political and business competition; (3) the ruling class’s subor-
dination of the institutions which supervise the press; (4) repression used 
against media critical of the government and (5) the lack of an independent 
public broadcasting corporation. As a consequence, the press has hardly 
any impact on the political processes taking place ahead of the parliamen-
tary election scheduled for 28 October. This is also an effect of a passi-
veness present in the Ukrainian public, who are tired of politics and are 
focused on social issues. Cases of abuse or corruption scandals revealed 
by the press do not provoke any response from the public and are rarely 
investigated by the public prosecution authorities. 
The more popular a given medium is, the more strongly it is controlled by 
the government. At present, television has to be recognised as the least re-
liable of the mass media. In turn, Internet news journals are characterised 
by the greatest pluralism but also have more limited accessibility. 
The political conditions in which the mass media operate in Ukraine lead 
to various forms of pathology. The most serious of them are censorship by 
the owners and self-censorship performed by journalists, and a great sha-
re of political advertorials. As the parliamentary election is approaching, 
the pathologies of the Ukrainian media market have been showing up with 
greater intensity. 
i s s u e  9 0  |  2 0 . 0 9 . 2 0 1 2  |  c e n t r e  f o r  e a s t e r n  s t u d i e s
commentaryosw
OSW.WAW.PL 2
The press and politics after 2010
The media and journalism in Ukraine were developing in relative freedom for five years after 
the Orange Revolution (2005–2010). This created an especially bright contrast with the 
second presidency of Leonid Kuchma, one symbol of which was the murder of journalist 
Georgiy Gongadze. The increasing pluralism and objectivism in the media was recognised 
as one of the key achievements of this revolution. The freedom of the press began to erode 
in the final period of the Orange government, when politicians strengthened their pressure 
on the press as the presidential election 
was approaching in January 2010. After 
the election, when Viktor Yanukovych took 
office, this process accelerated rapidly. 
The owners of the largest media holdings 
subordinated themselves to the govern-
ment and brought back tighter control of 
their information policies. This was done 
with the intention to discipline the journa-
lists so that their actions did not expose the media owners to conflict with the ruling class. 
As a consequence, the television channels and printed press titles most popular at present 
support the government in various ways or refrain from criticising it. This is because the 
government has a number of instruments of control, such as financial or administrative sanc-
tions, which could adversely affect the key businesses of the oligarchs who own the media. 
The media are used by the owners as means of information support for their business and 
political activity and as an instrument for taking care of their own image and maintaining 
good relations with the government. Much lower priority is attached to the function of the 
media as a means of communication between the government and the public. News pre-
sented in the press is frequently manipulated, and facts inconvenient for the government are 
passed over. 
The last two and a half years has also been a time during which the activity of media critical 
of the government has been restricted and during which there have been increasing cases of 
the rights of journalists being breached as well as the freedom of this profession. In 2010, 
the state authority in charge of media market regulation deprived the two opposition TV 
channels, TVi and Kanal 5, of the additional frequencies they had been granted before the 
election, and gave these frequencies to the station Inter, which was loyal to the government. 
In August 2011, TVi did not receive a digital broadcasting licence, which all broadcasters 
will be required to hold from 2015.Court proceedings are currently being conducted against 
Mykola Kniazhytsky, the director of TVi, on charges of irregularities in the payment of taxes, 
and part of cable TV operators have removed this station from their lists of programmes or 
shifted it to the more expensive packages1. Over this period, political and economic pressure 
has been put on journalists and broadcasters, they have been threatened and beaten, law-
suits have been brought against them and censorship has been used2. 
The pathologies of the Ukrainian media
The symbiosis between the media owners and the government has led to the development of 
numerous pathologies. The most negative phenomena, which have gained in intensity over the 
past few months, are censorship by owners and self-censorship by journalists. The former 
is manifested through pressure applied by the media owners on editors of news programmes 
and newspapers. In turn, the latter operates as a factor which imposes self-limitation by jour-
nalists in their choice of topic or the interpretation of an event, taking into account the politi-
 
 
 
1 In the opinion of its workers, 
this station has thus lost over 
one and a half million viewers; 
http://maidan.org.ua/2012/08/
volya-vidklyuchaje-tvi/
2 See for example http://
www.telekritika.ua/pra-
va/2011-06-06/63408
Since Viktor Yanukovych took power 
in February 2002, the television 
channels and press titles most 
popular at present have supported 
the government in various ways 
or refrained from criticising it.
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cal or economic interests of the owner of a given medium. Another widespread phenomenon 
in the Ukrainian media is called ‘dzhinsa’, which means a political advertorial ordered and 
paid for by someone from the outside in order to promote (‘zakazukha’) or discredit (‘chornu-
kha’) specific individuals. ‘Dzhinsa’ can be both political and economic. It is put into practice 
on the level of the publisher or manager, and is directly carried out by a journalist. The Ukra-
inian political opposition has limited possibilities to take advantage of ‘dzhinsa’ before the 
parliamentary election in the most popular media, since their owners are afraid of conflict with 
the government3. This practice has been monopolised by the ruling class, candidates loyal to 
the government, and representatives of groupings which are officially promoting themselves 
as the opposition but in fact will collaborate with the government after the election. In August, 
UT-1, ISTV and TRK Ukraina were the leaders of ‘dzhinsa’ among television channels4. 
In turn, Kanal 5 broadcast the smallest amount of such materials. In the printed press, 
the daily Komsomolskaya Pravda in Ukra-
ine was the leader in this period, 20% of 
whose publications were in fact covert po-
litical advertisements5. In turn, in some re-
gional media (which are poorer and more 
dependent on local governments and busi-
nessmen), whose role will be more impor-
tant in the upcoming election because half 
of the MPs will be elected in single-mem-
ber constituencies, the share of ‘dzhinsa’ 
reaches as much as 40%6. Another patho-
logy existing in the Ukrainian press is the 
manipulation of public opinion, for example through the lack of balance in the selection of 
politicians and commentators invited to the studio or to the newspapers. The participants 
of the most popular political talk shows on UT-1 and Inter are predominantly representati-
ves of the government. The key opposition parties are marginalised, while politicians from 
the nationalist party Svoboda are the most frequent guests. These are seen as being easy 
opponents for the ruling class. It has also been reported that the talk show hosts consult the 
lists of participants with the Presidential Administration, and politicians pay for their parti-
cipation in the show7. The experts and journalists invited to the studio also quite frequently 
work as political consultants for individual politicians or parties, but the audience are not 
informed of this. 
The special characteristics of the press in Ukraine
Despite the regression in the level of the freedom of speech which has been observed 
in Ukraine, the media are among those few institutions which the Ukrainian public tru-
sts more than distrusts (40% and 28% respectively8). At the same time, almost 60% of 
the respondents believe that political censorship exists in the Ukrainian press9. A segment 
of state-owned media is present in Ukraine, but with the exception of the television channel 
UT-1 they do not play any major role. In turn, the key media are concentrated in the hands 
of several political and business groups. This process began already in the 1990s, when 
the oligarchs created media holdings operating in the key segments of the market, each of 
which consisted of several TV channels and newspaper titles (see Appendix 1). As a rule, 
the media are not their key business assets, and in most of the cases they are not profitable 
or close to being profitable. The most trustworthy, albeit not completely unbiased, are those 
media which are independent of the Ukrainian oligarchs politically and in terms of capital, 
and thus also from the ruling class. However, their number is small, and – as with the me-
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 More advertorials for politi-
cians from the opposition can 
be found in the local media, 
mainly in western Ukraine. 
4 See for example http://tyzh-
den.ua/News/59731
 
 
5 See for example http://vybory.
mediasapiens.ua/2012/09/10/
kozhen-p-yatyj-material-v-
komsomolskoj-pravde-je-
dzhynsoyu-imi/ 
 
 
 
6 See for example http://tyzh-
den.ua/News/54318
 
 
 
 
7 See for example P. Pogorzelski, 
‘Iluzja wolności słowa’, 
NEW 3-4/2012
 
 
 
8 A survey conducted by the 
Kiev International Institute of 
Sociology in February 2012; 
http://kiis.com.ua/ua/news/
view-152.html
9 A survey conducted by the 
Razumkov Centre in October 
2010; http://www.razum-
kov.org.ua/ukr/poll.php?poll_
id=563
The symbiosis between the media 
owners and the government has led 
to the development of numerous 
pathologies: censorship by owners, 
self-censorship by journalists and 
‘dzhinsa’, i.e. a political advertorial 
aimed at promoting or discrediting 
specific individuals.
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dia who openly oppose the government – they have less capital and thus a weaker impact. 
These media are tolerated by the government and are used by it as proof of the existence of 
the freedom of speech in Ukraine in contacts with the West. In turn, Russian media, inclu-
ding TV stations which can be watched in Ukraine, are losing their impact every year, and 
are now sitting outside the top ten most popular channels in rankings10. 
• Television
According to public opinion polls carried out in Ukraine, television is the source of informa-
tion on the situation domestically and abroad for 78% of the public11. This segment of the 
market is predominantly monopolised by the groups with Ukrainian capital, usually with 
political connections. Ukraine’s most popular TV channel, Inter, is controlled by Valeriy 
Khoroshkovskyi, currently the first deputy prime minister. The other five most popular Ukra-
inian TV stations are owned by: Rinat Akhmetov, a member of the Party of Regions and the 
richest man in Ukraine (TRK-Ukraina), Ihor Kolomoyskyi, Ukraine’s third richest man (1+1), 
and Viktor Pinchuk, the second richest man in Ukraine (STB, ISTV, Novyi Kanal)12. The tenth 
most popular is UT-1, which is formally a state-owned TV station but is managed by people 
linked to Khoroshkovskyi. 
The stations which are moderately critical of the government or which openly oppose it, 
have significantly smaller audiences. Kanal 5(which is owned by Petro Poroshenko, Ukra-
ine’s eighth richest man, who is the current minister for trade and economic development 
and who was earlier linked to the ‘Orange’ 
camp), which used to be the most impor-
tant medium of the opposition during the 
Orange Revolution, is now ranked betwe-
en 11th and 15th among the most popu-
lar stations (approximately 1% of average 
daily viewership). In turn, TVi, which is in open opposition to the government and which is 
controlled by the émigré Russian businessman Konstantin Kagalovsky, a former manager of 
Yukos, has trouble holding on to its top twenty ranking of Ukraine’s most popular TV chan-
nels, and its average viewership is approximately 0.5%. 
The popularity of TV stations affects the viewership levels of the publicist and news pro-
grammes, including such flagship products as political talk shows with the participation of 
politicians, journalists, experts and the public. The top show is ‘Big Politics with Yevgeniy 
Kiselev’ on Inter channel (16% share in the broadcasting time), ‘Freedom of Speech with 
Andriy Kulykov’ on ISTV (11%) and ‘Shuster live’ on UT-1 (10%). The talk shows on Kanal 5 
and TVi have much lower viewership ratings, namely: ‘ResPublika with Anna Bezulyk’ (2%) 
and ‘A Night with Mykola Kniazhytsky’ (1%)13. According to the results of the monitoring 
of news and publicist programmes14, the viewers of the most popular TV channels receive 
a greater part of manipulated information. At the same time, the opposition TVi channel 
does not always meet the standards of unbiased journalism, either.
• The printed press 
40% of the residents of Ukraine point to the printed press as being their main source of 
information15. Weeklies prevail among the titles with nationwide coverage, while dailies 
have only a 1% share. Several Western European publishers, such as Hubert Burda Media 
Holding GmbH&Co or Edipresse-Ukraine, operate on the private press market. However, as 
with the TV stations, the concentration of assets in the hands of Ukrainian capital is evident. 
As a consequence, press publications are often used for political struggle or for the promo-
tion of the economic interests of the owner of a given title. At the same time, the pluralism of 
opinion in this segment is more present in this segment of the media market than on the TV 
 
 
 
10 In 2010, the average audi-
ence figures for the most 
popular Russian TV channel 
in Ukraine, 1 Kanal, was not 
higher than 2%. 
11 A survey conducted by the 
Gorshenin Institute in No-
vember 2011; http://news.
dt.ua/SOCIETY/ukrayintsi_tsi-
kavlyatsya_politikoyu_tak_
samo,_yak_i_ekonomikoyu_
golovnim_dzherelom_infor-
matsiyi_yak_-91972.html
12 On the basis of the rating 
prepared by Forbes. See  
http://www.newsru.ua/
ukraine/10apr2012/forbesua.
html
13 Data for the first half of 2012 
for TV viewers over 18 in cities 
with populations over 50,000. 
See http://www.mediabusi-
ness.com.ua/?option=com_co
ntent&task=view&id=31115
&Itemid
14 The media are monitored for 
example by the Telekritika 
portal and the Academy of 
Ukrainian Press.
15 Surveys of the Gorshenin 
Institute, op.cit.
As the parliamentary election is ap-
proaching, the public have less and 
less access to reliable information.
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16 See http://www.telekritika.ua/
news/2012-02-28/69956
 
17 However, one should remem-
ber that most magazines in 
Ukraine inflate their circulation 
numbers in order to attract 
advertisers.  
18 Surveys of the Gorshenin 
Institute, op.cit.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19 http://www.liveinternet.ru/
rating/ua/
 
 
 
20 http://blogosphere.com.
ua/2012/07/27/internet-users-
in-ukraine-inmind
market owing to the larger number of entities operating on it and the fact that smaller funds 
are necessary to launch a newspaper or magazine title. The top two titles are the daily Se-
godnya owned by Rinat Akhmetov and the newspaper Fakty i Kommentarii owned by Viktor 
Pinchuk16. Further positions are occupied by the dailies Ekspres and Gazeta Po-Ukrainsky, 
which have significantly lower circulation and popularity but are not linked to the large media 
holdings, and the Ukrainian version of the Russian newspaper Kommersant. In the segment 
of socio-political weeklies, high positions are held by Dzerkalo Tyzhnya, which is critical of 
the government, and the moderate Korrespondent17. At the same time, the system for the 
distribution of the printed press is a problem, making it available mainly in the largest cities.
• The Internet 
The Internet is the main source of information for 17% of the residents of Ukraine18 and 
is among the most rapidly developing segments of the media market. The stimulus for the 
development of news portals came with the crisis of 2008, when the publishers were sear-
ching for inexpensive possibilities of presenting content due to falling incomes from adverti-
sements. In effect, most of the press publications, TV stations and individual programmes 
from their broadcast schedules have their own websites. Some magazines withdrew from 
the paper version and moved completely to the Internet (for example, Levyi Bereg, Telekri-
tika, Ekonomicheskie Izvestia).
According to information available19, the average number of users for July-September 2012 
ranges between almost 250 thousands daily in the case of the Ukrajinska Pravda portal to 
over 100,000 in the case of the Segodnya website. This means that on average 2% of Ukra-
inian Internet users visit the most popular news portals. The total number in February 2012 
was estimated at approximately 17 million (42% of the adult residents of Ukraine), of whom 
12 million use the Internet every day20. The number of users of social networking services is 
also growing rapidly in Ukraine, for example Facebook (over 2 million). 
The rapid development of the media in the Internet and of information exchange via social 
networking services is taking place against a background of the falling popularity of the tra-
ditional media, such as television, radio and the printed press. This process is not specific to 
the Ukrainian market only; it fits in with the global trend. At the same time, the motivation 
to use the web may be seen a characteristic feature of the Ukrainian Internet. It seems that 
the lack of a public broadcaster, the mani-
pulations and the fact that their interests 
are represented at a low level in the tradi-
tional press are making Ukrainians willing 
to search for an alternative source of infor-
mation, that being the Internet. The social 
networking services also make it a space 
for an open and free discussion for journa-
lists who, while working in the traditional 
media must often take into account the interests of the owner and impose self-censorship. 
This leads to the formation of two parallel, albeit asymmetrical, information realities in Ukra-
ine: the reality of television and the reality of the Internet, where the interpretation of events, 
including political, often varies dramatically. 
Conclusion
Freedom of speech has been regularly restricted over the past two years in Ukraine. This has 
been proven by reports from international organisations, such as Reporters Without Borders 
(in 2009, Ukraine was ranked 89th and in 2011 116th) and Freedom House, in whose opi-
Two asymmetrical information realities 
are being formed in Ukraine: 
the reality of television and the reality 
of the Internet, where the interpreta-
tion of events, including political, 
often varies dramatically.
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21 See Press Freedom Index; 
http://en.rsf.org/press-freedom-
index-2011-2012,1043.html
22 On 18 September, the 
parliament of Ukraine passed 
legal amendments at the first 
reading which provide for 
criminal liability to be imposed 
for example on journalists for 
actions which are defined 
as ‘slandering’ others. 
nion Ukraine has lost the status of a ‘free’ country and has become ‘partly free’21. As the par-
liamentary election is approaching, the government is intensifying pressure on media which 
criticise it and are in opposition to it22. The opposition candidates have restricted access to 
the most popular media. The number of cases where journalists’ rights are breached, when 
they are beaten or impeded in carrying out their work is also growing. The monitoring of TV 
programmes and the printed media also reveals an increase in the number of advertorials, 
an avoidance of topics which are inconvenient for the government, the presentation of ma-
terials contrary to journalistic standards and other forms of manipulation of public opinion 
by media which are controlled by the oligarchs and the state. In effect, as the parliamentary 
election is approaching, the pathologies of the Ukrainian media market are gaining strength, 
and the public have less and less access to reliable information. 
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Key media owners in Ukraine
Rinat 
Akhmetov
Ihor 
Kolomoyskyi
Viktor 
Pinchuk
Valeriy 
Khoroshkovskyi
Petro 
Poroshenko
TV channels TRK Ukraine
Football
Football+
1+1
2+2
TET
1+1 International
Novyj
ISTV
STB
M1
M2
Inter
K1
K2
NTN
MTV Ukraine
Kanal 5
Newspapers, 
magazines 
and other
Segodnya
Salon Dona 
i Basa
Donetskie 
Novosti
Priazovskiy 
Rabochiy
Izvestia 
v Ukraine
UNIAN 
(press agency)
Gazeta po-kievski
Fakty 
i Kommentarii
Delo
Invest Gazeta
Korrespondent
